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CREDITORS' BALL: THE "NEW" NEW CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN CHAPTER 11
DAVID A. SKEEL, JR.!
For well over a year, the papers have been filled with hand wringing about the sorry state of American corporate governance. We read
that Wall Street's watchers-especially the securities analysts and auditors-were so riven with conflicts of interest during the stock market
boom that the only things they were watching were their own bank accounts. As I write, the former chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") is barnstorming the country, telling everyone that he tried to warn us back in the 1990s. The SEC needed
more money, he says, among many other complaints, and more freedom from political interference to do itsjob.'
For the companies that epitomized the governance crisis, bankruptcy is now where the action is. Nearly all of them-Enron, WorldCoin, Adelphia, Global Crossing-currently are doing their business
in Chapter 11. An observer who followed the bankruptcy literature
(and the occasional New York Times or Wall StreetJournalarticle) in the
1990s, and who had lost touch since then, might well have expected
the filings to prompt a second round of hand wringing, this time
about America's miserable bankruptcy framework.
A decade 2 ago,
••
many observers believed that Chapter 11 was irretrievably flawed. Yet
here we are, only a few years later, and surprisingly few people seem to
be complaining about corporate bankruptcy. One hears occasional

t Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania.

I am grateful to Barry Adler,

William Bratton, Jesse Fried, Rishi Gupta, Melissa Jacoby, Lynn LoPucki, Bruce
Markell, John Pottow, Bob Rasmussen, Bill Schorling, Alan Schwartz, Michael Whincop, and Todd Zywicki; to the Bankruptcy and Creditors' Rights practice group of
Klett, Rooney, Lieber & Schorling; to participants at the University of Pennsylvania
Law Review's Corporate Control Transactions Symposium on February 8-9, 2003 for
helpful comments; and to the University of Pennsylvania Law School for generous
summer funding.
This Article was first written in late 2002. The ex-chair of the SEC is Arthur
Levitt, and his complaints are chronicled in the book, ARTHUR LEVITT, JR., TAKE ON
THE STREET 131-33 (2002), which was the occasion for the tour.
2 For a discussion of the concerns with, and a critique of, the principal
proposals
to replace Chapter 11 with an alternative regime, see David A. Skeel, Jr., Markets,
Courts, and the Brave New World of Bankruptcy Theory, 1993 WIS. L. REv. 465, 466-94.
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worries, to be sure. There was a brief flurry of articles suggesting that3
Chapter 11 may have been too "biased toward saving failing firms;"
WorldCom competitors such as Verizon and AT&T have complained
that bankruptcy has given WorldCom unfair advantages;4 and there
have been running accounts of the size of the professionals' fees in
the Enron case. But these days bankruptcy is more often described as
a solution than as a problem.
Perhaps this simply shows that it's all relative: American corporate
governance looks so bad at the moment that even a deeply flawed
bankruptcy framework comes out smelling like a rose by comparison.
Another possible explanation is that Chapter 11 was always a better
system than its most fervent critics contended.
Both of these explanations are at least partially true. I plan, however, to focus on a third explanation: the fact that Chapter 11 decision making itself has changed quite dramatically in the past decade.
The endless negotiations and mind-numbingly bureaucratic process
that seemed to characterize bankruptcy in the 1980s have been replaced by transactions that look more like the market for corporate
control. Whereas the debtor and its managers seemed to dominate
bankruptcy only a few years ago, Chapter 11 now has a distinctively
creditor-oriented cast. Chapter 11 no longer functions like an antitakeover device for managers; it has become, instead, the most important new frontier in the market for corporate control, complete with
asset sales and faster cases.
Unlike the "new" bankruptcy governance ushered in by Congress
in 1978,6 the "new" new7 Chapter 11 governance is contractual in
3 Daniel Altman, Chapter 11 ? Or Time to Close the Books?, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 15, 2002,
§ 3, at 1 (quoting Michelle J. White, an economics professor at the University of California at San Diego) (internal quotes omitted); see also Sarah McBride, Australia's
Tough-Minded Bankruptcies May Serve as Role Model, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 2002, at A2
(asking whether "the U.S. system-one that follows a 'rescue' approach... -wastes
economic resources, diverts funds to hefty legal and consulting fees and slows down
overall economic growth").
4 See, e.g., infra note 73 and accompanying text (describing the competitors'
complaints about WorldCom)
5 See, e.g., David Barboza, Lauryer Proves a Thorn for Enron's Partners,
N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 21, 2002, at C1 (describing how the Atlanta-based firm of court-appointed examiner, Neal Batson, is billing Enron $3 million a month to investigate its activities and
partners); Mitchell Pacelle, Enron Bankruptcy is Fee Bonanza: Lauyers' Laundry and
Bartabsamong $280 million in Charges,WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2002, at C1 (describing the
legal fees and the approval process for those fees).
6 Chapter 11 replaced the much harsher provisions of the previous
Bankruptcy
Act with provisions permitting the debtor's managers to continue running the business, giving them the exclusive right to propose a reorganization plan for the first
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nature. Creditors have converted two existing contractual tools into
important governance levers." The first is debtor-in-possession (DIP)
financing. Before they even file for bankruptcy, corporate debtors
must arrange an infusion of cash to finance their operations in Chapter 11. To an increasing extent, lenders are using these loan contracts
to influence corporate governance in bankruptcy. The fate of an asset
or division of the company, even the terms of a transfer of control, has
been spelled out as terms in a debtor's DIP financing agreement. The
second is that key executives are increasingly given performance-based
compensation packages in Chapter 11. The most common strategy is
to promise the executives a large bonus if they complete the reorganization quickly; likewise, executives face ever-smaller bonuses if the
case takes longer.
My aim in this Article is to make sense of these developments,
both by putting them into historical context and by identifying the
concerns they raise. In Part I, I describe the complaints about Chapter 11 in the 1980s and the increasing use of DIP financing agreements and performance-based pay to reshape Chapter 11 governance.
I also explain how creditors can influence the composition and focus
of the debtor's board of directors during the bankruptcy case. In Part
II, I briefly summarize the virtues of the new Chapter 11 governance.
In Parts III and IV, I consider some of the concerns raised by each of
the governance levers. With respect to DIP financing (the subject of
Part III), I point out that the DIP lender's priority status can produce
a variety of troubling effects. An existing lender may use the new financing arrangement to improve its pre-bankruptcy position. Some
lenders may also have too great a bias toward liquidation, which could
hurt creditors as a whole and in coming years could undermine an

one hundred twenty days of the case, and relying on negotiations between the debtor
and its creditors to effect the reorganization. For a detailed discussion of the history
and implications of Chapter 1l's new governance regime, see DAVID A. SKEEL, JR.,
DEBT'S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAw IN AMERICA 160-83, 212-37 (2001).
7 With apologies to Michael Lewis. MICHAEL LEWIS, THE NEW NEW
THING (2000).
8 Another important development-albeit one
that was well underway in the
1980s---is the role of the market for claims in Chapter 11. I have discussed this development, and its use as a device for acquiring control of the corporate debtor, in other
work. See Robert K. Rasmussen & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Economic Analysis of Corporate
Bankruptcy Law, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 85, 101-04 (1995) (noting the "exponential
increase in claims trading" and discussing a claimant's potential acquisition of enough
claims to exercise veto power over proposed reorganization plans); David A. Skeel, Jr.,
The Nature and Effect of Corporate Voting in Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases, 78 VA. L. REV.
461, 513-18 (1992) (describing the same dramatic increase in claims trading and the
same potential for the acquisition of veto power).
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aspect of Chapter 11 that I refer to as its "antitrust benefit." Although
the debtor's managers agree to the terms of the financing, they cannot be expected to focus on the best interests of the firm when it has
encountered financial distress. With executive compensation (Part
IV), I argue that pre-bankruptcy bonuses raise serious fairness and efficiency concerns, but that the concerns are much weaker in the postpetition environment.
The prescriptive tone of this analysis should not obscure the fact
that the two governance levers have dramatically improved the quality
of Chapter 11 governance. Part V makes this explicit by re-emphasizing the virtues of the new regime.
I. CH-CH-CHANGES
The late 1980s and early 1990s were both the best and the worst of
times for large-scale corporate reorganization in America. The enactment of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code 9 had taken off the fetters that
stymied corporate bankruptcy for forty years. Chapter X of the Chandler Act'°-the chapter designed for large corporations under the old
Bankruptcy Act-replaced the managers of a debtor that filed for
bankruptcy with a court-appointed trustee. Chapter 11 of the new
1978 Code, by contrast, authorized the managers to continue operating the business and gave them the exclusive right to propose a reorganization plan." The number of large Chapter 11 cases soared, but
there were also a growing number of complaints about the very provisions that had restored bankruptcy's luster. Chapter 11 seemed to
give too much control to the debtor's managers, enabling them to stiffarm creditors and drag out the bankruptcy cases for inordinate periods of time. Managers were playing with creditors' money, and large
cases often lasted several years or more.12
The worst offender was Eastern Airlines (Eastern). Although it
was clear to just about everyone that Eastern should be sold, Eastern's
CEO Frank Lorenzo postponed the inevitable for several years as
9 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat.
2549 (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. 101 et seq. (2000)).
10 Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840, 883 (repealed by Pub. L. No.
95598, fit. IV, § 401 (a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2682 (1978)).
Jl As noted earlier, I have discussed these developments
in detail elsewhere. See

supra note 6 (describing Chapter 11 provisions that replaced the harsher Bankruptcy
Act).
12 See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, The Trouble with Chapter 11, 1993 WIs. L. REv. 729,
739-45 (surveying data on case duration).
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Eastern's value deteriorated.
In the end, Eastern's assets were
liquidated at a fraction of what they had been worth at the outset of
the bankruptcy case.13
With Eastern as their poster child, critics began to call for major
changes to Chapter 11. In the bankruptcy literature, a vibrant debate
developed as to whether Chapter14 11 should be replaced by a faster,
more market-oriented alternative.
And then a funny thing happened. The most obvious problems
with Chapter 11-the endless cases and absence of market discipline-started to disappear. Within a few years, there were more
auctions in bankruptcy, and claims trading sometimes simulated
a market for corporate control.' 5 In the past several years, the changes
have been even more dramatic. In most large cases, the same
creditors who seemed so helpless only a few years ago are now calling
most of the shots.16 Chapter 11 is still remarkably debtor friendly
by international standards, but creditors now exert much more influence over a case than at any time in recent history. The result is faster
cases that rely more on asset sales and the market for corporate control than on negotiations to move the restructuring process along.

13

See, e.g., Claudia MacLachlan, Blame Flys in Demise of Airline, NAT'L L.J., May 27,

1991, at 1, 35-36 (detailing how unsecured creditors' shares fell to only 2.8 cents on the
dollar and assigning blame for Eastern's demise to Lorenzo).
14 Among the most prominent proposals were calls for a stock cancellation scheme
and for both traditional and options-based auctions of the debtor's business. See, e.g.,
Barry E. Adler, Financialand PoliticalTheories of American CorporateBankruptcy, 45 STAN.
L. REV. 311, 323-33 (1993) (proposing a "chameleon equity" scheme that would cancel
existing stock and convert lowest priority debt into new stock); Philippe Aghion et. al.,
The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform, 8J.L. ECON. & ORG. 523, 532-36 (1992) (developing
the options-based auction idea); Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15J. LEGAL STUD. 127, 136-38 (1986) (advocating a standard auction of the
bankrupt company's assets); Lucian A. Bebchuk, A New Approach to CorporateReorganizations, 101 HARV. L. REv. 775, 785 (1988) (proposing an options scheme that would
permit each shareholder or creditor to acquire an equity interest if they paid a pro rata
share of all higher priority claims); but see Skeel, supra note 2, at 472-93 (describing
and critiquing each of the proposals).
For a discussion of the role of the market for Chapter 11 claims, see Rasmussen
& Skeel, supra note 8, at 101-05.
16 The recent airline bankruptcies-US Airways and United-are
a particularly
good example. In United, the lenders' cost reduction requirements have induced
the company to make major layoffs. See Susan Carey, UAL Will Lay Off 1,500 Workers as
Part of Cost-Cutting Strategy, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2003, at A3 (reporting United's plan to
meet financing goals by laying off fourteen percent of its employees). US Airways's
principal lender threatened to force liquidation unless unions agreed to major paycuts. Micheline Maynard, US Air's Chief Lender Threatens the Ultimate, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 7,
2002, at Cl.
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How did everything change so fast? In part, the transformation
reflects a change in the profile of American business. Unlike the
businesses that traditionally landed in bankruptcy-railroads, in the
nineteenth century, or industrial firms thereafter-many contemporary businesses depend on knowledge and ideas rather than on hard
assets. Because these companies' most important assets can walk out
the door at any moment, they cannot afford to negotiate for months
or years toward an eventual restructuring. They must resolve their
difficulties immediately; often, the only way to do this is to sell key assets at or shortly after the time of bankruptcy. In addition, markets
for assets, and even for entire companies, are much more liquid than
ever before. 7
More importantly, several remarkable contractual developments
have been intertwined with this shift in the nature of American business. First, lenders increasingly have used their post-petition financing agreements to shape the governance of the Chapter 11 case. The
second contractual strategy makes a direct appeal to managers' wallets. By crafting "pay to stay" agreements that depend heavily on
bonuses based on the speed of the reorganization or the price
obtained in asset sales, creditors have given managers dramatically different incentives than they had in the 1980s.
These contractual changes have shifted the ethos of bankruptcy in
ways that go beyond the contracts themselves. Although bankruptcy
law does not formally authorize creditors to displace the company's
directors, creditors have increasingly exercised de facto control. Directors are now more likely to respond, for instance, to creditors' notso-subtle threat that "'sooner or later we'll own the company and
we're not going to re-elect you so you should get out now."'""
The following subsections briefly describe and explain each of
these new developments.

See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., The Crash of Enron, PHILA. INQ., Dec. 9, 2001, at D5
(characterizing these developments as "New Economy Bankruptcy"). The shift from
traditional corporate reorganization to sales of assets is a central theme of Douglas
Baird and Bob Rasmussen's work proclaiming the "end" of bankruptcy. Douglas G.
Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 751 (2002).
Baird and Rasmussen also emphasize the development of sophisticated financial
contracts that can be used to shift control rights outside of bankruptcy. Id. at 777-85.
18 Jared Sandberg &Joann S. Lublin, Who Runs
WorldCom?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16,
2002, at B1, B4 (quoting bankruptcy lawyer Evan Flaschen).
17
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A. Debtor in PossessionFinancing: Creditors'New Power Tool
When commentators distinguish Chapter 11 from other countries'
corporate reorganization laws, they increasingly point to DIP
financing as a crucial benefit of Chapter 11. The magical provision is
Section 364,'9 which authorizes the bankruptcy court to roll out the
red carpet for a lender that is willing to make a new loan to the
debtor. First, the court can treat the DIP loan as an administrative
expense, which puts it behind only existing, secured lenders in the
priority hierarchy. Second, if the debtor has unencumbered assets,
the court can give the DIP lender a security interest in those assets,
thus putting the DIP lender on the same footing as the company's
secured creditors. Finally, if most or all of the debtors' assets are
already spoken for, Section 364 provides its most dramatic option of
all: the court can give the DIP lender a so-called "priming lien"-that
is, a security interest that takes priority even over existing security interests in the same collateral.
DIP financing dates back well over a century to the equity
receiverships that were used to reorganize troubled railroads and that
effected the first large-scale corporate reorganizations in America. °
In order to facilitate short-term financing to pay suppliers and other
essential creditors, courts created a device known as the "receiver's
certificate." 21 The receiver's certificate gave a special priority-sometimes trumping even senior liens-to investors who contributed new
funds to the troubled enterprise.22 This enabled even the most debtladen railroad to raise money to pay short-term expenses during the
23
reorganization process.

11 U.S.C. § 364 (2000).
The emergence of equity receiverships is recounted and explained in SKEEL,
supra note 6, at 48-70.
2 For an example of a court's authorization of
the "receiver's certificate" device,
see Meyer v. Johnson, 53 Ala. 237 (1875).
22 Id. at 354.
23 For a discussion of the role that receiver's certificates
played in addressing the
debt overhang problem, see, for example, Peter Tufano, Business Failure,JudicialIntervention, and FinancialInnovation: RestructuringU.S. Railroadsin the Nineteenth Century, 71
Bus. HisT. REV. 1, 8-9 (1997), which notes that receiver's certificates were a means to
raise cash quickly, but did not solve long-term capital needs. During this same era,
courts permitted the debtor to pay suppliers in cash, even if senior creditors had a lien
on the railroad's income, pursuant to the so-called six months rule. See, e.g.,
James
Byrne, The Foreclosure of Railroad Mortgages in the United States Courts, in SOME LEGAL
PHASES OF CORPORATE FINANCING, REORGANIZATION AND REGULATION, at 77, 124
(1917) (discussing the preferred status generally enjoyed by those claims that accrue
19

20
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In sharp contrast to today's DIP lenders, the investors who
financed receivership certificates did not figure prominently in the
governance of the troubled company. Far more important were the
company's investment bankers-usually J.P. Morgan; Kuhn, Loeb; or
one of a handful of their peers. The investment banks, together with
their lawyers, set up committees to represent the stock or bonds they
had previously underwritten, negotiated the terms of the restructuring
with the debtor's managers, and used the reorganization plan to raise
24
money. The standard technique for raising money was to issue new
stock and debt in connection with the restructuring. The "purchasers" were the company's existing stock and debtholders, who usually
paid a cash "assessment" in return for the privilege of retaining an
interest in the reorganized railroad.25
To understand why today's post-petition financiers figure so much
more prominently than did their predecessors, the investors in receivers' certificates, we need to add one more historical detail: in the
1930s, as part of their rebellion against Wall Street's influence, the
New Deal reformers booted the Wall Street investment banks and lawyers out of the large-scale reorganization practice.26 Chapter X of the
Chandler Act, which was drafted largely by future Supreme Court
Justice William Douglas, achieved this goal by requiring that the
debtor's managers be replaced by a court-appointed trustee and by
prohibiting any bankers or lawyers who had represented the debtor
prior to bankruptcy from playing any role in the bankruptcy. 27 The
number of large corporate bankruptcies plummeted, 28 and the influence of Wall Street in reorganization disappeared for decades.
Since the 1930s, the financing of large corporate reorganizations
has been accomplished primarily through retained earnings and bank

within six months). As with receivers' certificates, the six months rule assured that
suppliers would not cut the debtor off. Id. at 123.
24 See SKEEL, supra note 6, at 58-59 (explaining the role of investment banks in late
nineteenth century railroad reorganizations).
25 See, e.g., Tufano, supra note 23, at 10-19 (describing the tendency of nineteenthcentury federal courts to set low "upset" prices to pressure security holders to agree to
pay the assessment).
26 For further discussion of the reforms in bankruptcy law during
the New Deal
era, see SKEEL, supra note 6, at 109-27.
27 Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840, 888 (repealed
by Pub. L. No. 95598, tit. IV, § 401(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2682 (1978)) (requiring a mandatory trustee, as
well as attorney, underwriter, and banker disinterestedness); see also 11 U.S.C. §§ 15658 (2001) (same).
28 See SKEEL, supra note 5, at 125 (noting that the
number of large reorganizations
dropped from more than five hundred in 1938 to fewer than one hundred in 1944).
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loans. Because corporate debtors do not have to make ongoing
payments on their pre-bankruptcy debt during the case, they may be
able to accumulate cash. But they may also need new funding from a
bank or other lender, and, even if they don't, the cash coming in is
often subject to the security interest of the bank that lent the company
money prior to bankruptcy. Therefore, before a corporate debtor can
use the new cash, it must obtain a cash collateral order that is designed to protect the bank's interest while the debtor uses the cash.29
Notice the dramatic shift in bankruptcy finance that has taken
place. Banks were at the center of the process in the nineteenth and
early-twentieth century, and they are at the center of it now. But now
we are talking about different banks. In contrast to the equity receivership era, when investment banks ran the show, bankruptcy finance
is now the domain of commercial banks.0
In the past decade, post-petition financing has become more important than ever before. 3' The large firms that filed for bankruptcy
in the 1980s often had a large amount of unsecured debt and comparatively little secured debt. As a result, when they filed for bankruptcy, the cash generated by the business was not all spoken for, and
the debtor could use this cash to finance the reorganization effort.
The large companies that have filed for bankruptcy more recently
have often relied more heavily on secured debt prior to bankruptcy,
and thus have less cash with which to work. Lenders have responded
to the greater importance of post-petition financing and to creditors'
concerns about the Chapter 11 process by using the terms of DIP
loans to shape the Chapter 11 case.
The financing of the US Airways bankruptcy is a particularly striking illustration of the recent trend. At the outset of its reorganization,
US Airways entered into an agreement to borrow up to $740 million
from the Retirement Systems of Alabama-$240 million up front,
29 See 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2000) (defining the rights and
powers of the trustee in liquidation and reorganization cases with respect to the use, sale or lease of property).
30 This is not to say that investment banks have no role in Chapter 11. To the
contrary, they figure quite prominently, but they perform functions like consulting on and
facilitating asset sales, rather than serving as underwriters. I should also note that the
investment banks of the early twentieth century-J.P. Morgan and its peers-also engaged in commercial banking. But their role in corporate reorganization stemmed
principally from their investment banking activities.
31 For evidence of the increasing use of DIP lending, see, for example,
Sris Chatterjee et al., Debtor-in-Possession Financing 7 (May 31, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), which finds that "[t]he number of firms obtaining DIP financing increased significantly during the 1990s from 27% in the early 1990s to 46%
in the late 1990s").
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$300 million during the case, and $200 million after US Airways was to
emerge from Chapter 11.32 The lender assured its influence over the
airline's governance and paved the way to take over after bankruptcy,
by bargaining for five seats on the twelve-member board of directors
and a promise of 37.5% of the stock of the newly reorganized com33
pany.
The US Airways financing thus was structured as a partial
takeover. In many cases, the lender is not planning to take over the
company. But even in these cases, the lenders frequently use their
DIP financing agreement to constrain the debtor's managers' wiggle
room.3 4 It is not an overstatement to say that the terms of the debtors'
post-petition financing regularly set the course, and even the outcome, of the Chapter 11 cases.
B. Keeping the Managers'Nose to the Grindstone:
Executive Compensation in Chapter11
Creditors' other new governance lever has been executive compensation. As with DIP financing agreements, creditors have relied
on clear, simple targets to prevent managers from frittering away a
company's value during a bankruptcy. Before the managers of a
debtor can be encouraged to preserve rather than squander firm
value, however, they often must be persuaded to stay.
Managerial compensation arrangements are designed to address
each of these issues. Start with managers' willingness to stay with the
sinking ship. The payments used to entice managers to stick around
32 See Maynard, supra note 16, at C1 (discussing
the demand by the Retirement
Systems of Alabama, US Airways' chief lender, for labor unions to cut wages and benefits to avoid liquidation of the airline).
33 Id. The Alabama pension subsequently negotiated for control
over two more

directors (bringing the number to seven) and agreed to lower its equity stake when US
Airways emerges to thirty six percent. Id.
Recent DIP financing agreements have required, for instance, that the debtor
sell specified assets or liquidate if they are not generating profits within the first few
months of the case. The interim financing agreement in the first FAO Schwartz bankruptcy was a particularly explicit illustration: it called for liquidation, unless the debtor
confirmed a reorganization plan by April 4, 2003. See FAO, Inc.: Reorganization Plan
Calls for the Closing of 83 Stores, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 4, 2003, § 3, at 2 (summarizing FAO
Inc.'s reorganization plan and describing how FAO needed court approval of the plan
in order to avoid liquidation). More commonly, lenders require that the debtor meet
specified cash flow targets as a prerequisite to further extensions of credit under a revolving credit agreement. In the United Airlines bankruptcy, for instance, these cash
flow targets were designed to force United to extract deep concessions from its unions.
See Marilyn Adams, Low-Cost CarrierPlan Trips Up UAL, USA TODAY, Mar. 14, 2003, at
3B (describing how United planned to break labor contracts to meet cash flow targets
set by lenders).
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during a bankruptcy
are usually referred to as "retention bonuses" or
"pay to stay. "35 It is not hard to appreciate why a debtor's managers
might welcome the "pay to stay strategy; indeed, the debtor's managers are ordinarily the ones who put forward the proposal. From the
creditors' perspective, on the other hand, the decision to approve
these bonuses is more complicated. After all, there is something a bit
odd about begging the same managers who navigated the firm into
bankruptcy to keep up the good work. Despite their reservations,
however, creditors increasingly have concluded that they are better off
paying to keep the debtor's existing managers in place. 3" These managers know the business best, and the process of hiring new managers
and bringing them up to speed could prove time-consuming and disruptive. According to one compensation expert, "[t]he wide use of
pay-to-stay bonuses is a shift from the last economic slowdown in the
early 1990s. . .. ,7 Although retention bonuses were used in a few
cases (such as the Federated Department Stores bankruptcy) in the
late 1980s and early 1990s, "creditors warmed to the idea on a larger
retail and electronics-chains suffer through major
scale after watching
38
executive flight.,
Nearly all of the mega-bankruptcies of the past several years have
made use of retention bonuses (though they have generated controversy at times). In WorldCom, for instance, the debtor asked for and
received court approval of a plan to use up to $25 million to pay
bonuses ranging from $20,000 to $125,000 to 329 of WorldCom's key
employees.9
Courts approved analogous bonus programs in the
Enron and Kmart bankruptcies.40
See, e.g., Ann Davis, Want Some Extra Cash? File for Chapter 11, WALL ST. J., Oct.
31, 2001, at C1 (reporting the popularity of "retention" and "pay to stay" bonuses in
recent restructuring cases).
35 In some recent cases, the managers are executives who were brought in before
bankruptcy or shortly after the filing to help restructure the company.
37 Davis, supra note 35, at Cl (quoting David R. Williams, a restructuring and
executive pay expert with PricewaterhouseCoopers).
38 Id.
39 Rebecca Blumenstein, WorldCom Judge Approves Plan to Keep Employees, WALL
ST.
J., Oct. 30, 2002, at B3.
See Yue infra note 42, at 1A (describing the Kmart bonus plan to retain
its
chairman and chief executive, Jim Adamson); Ahrens, infra note 43, at D13 (describing the Enron bonuses). In some cases, creditors have agreed to foot the bill for retention bonuses directly. In the Washington Group International (WGI) bankruptcy, the
debtor's lenders agreed to fund bonuses for 490 key employees (some of whom could
receive as much as $29 million) in return for all of the stock in a new company that
would acquire WGI's assets. Although the plan created consternation among WGI
employees who were not included in the plan, the court approved the bonus plan.
35
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Now, simply paying managers to stay does not necessarily ensure
they will reorganize the company efficiently.4' This is where pay-forperformance, the second new innovation in bankruptcy compensation, comes into play. Rather than paying managers a straight cash
salary in Chapter 11, creditors have insisted in recent cases that the
managers' compensation be tied to the company's progress under
Chapter 11. The most straightforward strategy for rewarding managers who handle the case expeditiously is to base their compensation,
at least in part, on the speed of the reorganization. 42
Another pay-for-performance strategy comes into play if the
debtor is expected to sell some or all of its assets in connection with
the Chapter 11 case. Creditors can maximize the managers' incentive
to obtain the highest price possible by giving them a piece of the action, and this is exactly what they have done in a number of recent
cases. In the Enron bankruptcy, for instance, the compensation
scheme is designed to give the managers bonuses for quickly selling
the debtor's assets. 43 In other cases, managers' bonuses have been
based not on the speed, but on the price they obtained in the asset
sale."

See Richard Korman, Pay-to-Stay Plan Miffs Employees, ENGINEERING NEWS-RECORD, June
18, 2001, at 12 (discussing the court-approved WGI bonus plan, which offered bonuses
to select employees); see also Cynthia Vinarsky, Youngstown WCI to Idle Sinter Company
Plant, VINDICATOR (Youngstown), May 1, 2001, at Al (noting a promise by lenders to
pay bonuses in connection with liquidation of CSC Ltd.)
41 Unless the bonuses are paid out in installments, it does not
even ensure that
they will stay, as we learned at the outset of the Kmart bankruptcy. See, e.g., Hawke
Fracassa & Karen Talaski, Kmart Investigates Its Former Executives, DETROIT NEWS, May 3,
2002, at Al (describing a Kmart merchandising executive who received a $750,000
retention loan, then left the company).
42 WorldCom's retention bonus plan, for instance,
provides for "Plan Progress
Bonuses" that start out at 10% of the value of the initial retention bonus. Under the
plan, key employees are entitled to 100% of the progress bonus if a reorganization
plan is confirmed in December 2003, 150% for a November 2003 confirmation, 200%
for an October 2003 confirmation, and 250% for confirmation by September 30, 2003.
Motion of the Debtors Pursuant to Sections 363(b) and 105(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code for Authorization to Establish a Key Employee Retention Plan at 6-7, In re
WorldCom, Inc., 296 B.R. 115 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) (No. 02-13533); see also Lorene
Yue, Kmart Lines Up Cashfor New Boss, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Apr. 5, 2002, at Al (discussing request to approve two year contract that would include $2.5 million signing bonus, $1 million in salary per year, and $4 million bonus if reorganization was completed by July 31, 2003; the bonus would decrease by $7299 per day thereafter, and
disappear if Kmart failed to emerge by April 30, 2004).
See, e.g., Frank Ahrens, Enron Filesfor New Bonuses, Severance, WASH. POST, Mar.
30, 2002, at DI 3 (discussing proposed bonuses for quickly selling assets).
44 See, e.g., E-mail from William H. Schorling, Shareholder, Klett,
Rooney, Lieber
& Schorling, Corp., to David A. Skeel, Jr., Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania
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We do not expect to see both of these new governance strategies
at work in every given case. DIP financing is more likely to be used as
a governance lever when there is a takeover offer on the table or it is
clear which divisions a debtor needs to sell. To give the most striking
recent example, the DIP financing of Trans World Airlines (TWA) was
conditioned on the prompt consummation of TWA's acquisition by
American Airlines.45 Where the direction is less obvious, as in the
WorldCom bankruptcy, creditors are less likely to dictate the course of
the case through the DIP financing agreement, and are more likely to
lean on pay-for-performance strategies as the principal mechanism for
moving cases along.
It is also worth emphasizing that the "creditors" involved in DIP
financing overlap with-but are not identical to-the ones that help
hammer out the terms of managerial compensation. DIP financing
comes from one or a small group of lenders who can impose explicit
governance conditions on their lending.46 With managerial compensation, on the other hand, creditors generally work through the creditors' committee as a whole, and their influence is not quite so direct.
The debtor-in-possession, rather than the committee, is usually the
one that asks the court to approve a pay or bonus package. But the
creditors' committee's fingerprints are all over the proposal. The pay
package is typically prenegotiated with the committee, and the
debtor's managers will be hesitant to file the motion for approval unless the committee is on board.47
One last caveat: the creditors' committee obviously is not involved-by definition, it does not even exist yet-if the debtor decides

(Dec. 20, 2003. 11:17:47 EST) (on file with author) (noting that bonuses were keyed to
asset sales in the Matlack and Printing Arts cases, and that this is common with key
Employee Retention Plan bonuses).
45 See Susan Carey, American Airlines' TWA FinancingPlan isApproved,
Although Rivals Cry Foul, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 2001, at A3 (reporting on American Airlines' acquisition of TWA).
46 See Chatterjee et al., supra note 31, at 11 (finding that ninety percent
of DIP
loans impose explicit restrictions on the debtor's operating activities). DIP lenders
also force changes-and sometimes effect a "slow liquidation"-through their control
over subsequent loan disbursements. See id. at 3 (claiming that DIP lenders are active
in monitoring firms and forcing changes).
Major creditors or the creditors' committee itself sometimes object to proposed
compensation packages, but these objections are lodged for strategic reasons or because of a breakdown in the discussions on the pay package, not because creditors disapprove of performance based pay. Interview with Bill Schorling, Partner, Klett, Rooney, Lieber & Schorling, in Philadelphia, PA (Dec. 18, 2002).
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to dole out retention bonuses before it files for bankruptcy. A
complete account of the new governance levers will need to take eveof-bankruptcy compensation into account, too, so I will throw this into
the mix when we return to the issue in Part IV.
C. Who's on First? Controllingthe Board ofDirectors in Chapter11
I have assumed throughout much of the discussion that the creditors have an arm's length relationship with the managers of the
debtor. But do they? If creditors can determine who is or is not on
the debtor's board of directors, they will find it much easier to shape
the company's governance in Chapter 11. The issue of who controls
the managers and board of directors in Chapter 11 is more interesting, and less clear, than first meets the eye.
Not so long ago, most observers assumed that a company's directors were, or at least should be, beholden to the company's shareholders in Chapter 11, just as they are outside of bankruptcy. Based
on this reasoning, shareholders sometimes asked for the right to hold
a shareholders' meeting in order to elect a new set of directors during
the Chapter 11 case.48 Courts were generally sympathetic to these
requests, except in cases where the shareholders seemed intent on derailing the reorganization process. The related issue of whether existing directors continue to listen to shareholders, or turn their ears to
creditors, after the company files for bankruptcy is more subtle; it is
not always easy to determine a director's loyalties, and the empirical
data are mixed. While directors sometimes seem to take their cues
from shareholders, this was not always the case.4 9
In the early years of the new millennium, many observers have
forgotten all about the old assumption that shareholders call the
directorial tune in Chapter 11. Observers sometimes assume, for instance, that a new manager cannot be brought on without the creditors' "approval." Strictly speaking, this is not true. Creditors' powers

For a discussion of the cases, and a defense of shareholders' right to hold a
meeting during bankruptcy, see Mark E. Budnitz, Chapter 11 Business Reorganizations
and Shareholder Meetings: Will the Meeting Please Come to Order, or Should the Meeting be
Cancelled Altogether?, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1214, 1227-30 (1990). For an argument
that shareholders generally should not have this power, see Skeel, supra note 8, at 50513.
49 See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford,
Corporate Governance in the
Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Corporations,141 U. PA. L. REV. 669, 672
(1993) (noting that directors sometimes serve the interests of their creditors rather
than their shareholders).
48
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are much less direct. To appreciate the precise nature of creditors'
influence, as well as its limits, we should briefly consider the leverage
creditors have at their disposal.
Even before bankruptcy, in cases involving DIP financing, the DIP
lender often insists that a restructuring officer be brought in as a
condition of providing the new financing. The not-so-subtle message
is this: unless the managers agree to additional oversight, they won't
get the loan 0
Creditors have two principal ways to influence the board once the
debtor files for bankruptcy. First, creditors can threaten to ask the
court to appoint a trustee unless the CEO or one or more board
members is replaced by a manager-often a corporate restructuring
officer-who is more acceptable to the creditors. 51 This is a powerful
threat, but it is also both blunt and indirect. Replacing the debtor's
managers with a trustee is a draconian step-a step that courts are
quite reluctant to take in the absence of fraud or other extraordinary
circumstances. Nor, in most cases, do creditors really want a trustee,
since the case would slow to a crawl while the trustee educated herself
about the debtor's business. The credibility of the creditors' threat
(as in all games of "chicken") therefore depends on their confidence
that the debtor's directors are more worried about the appointment
of a trustee than are the creditors.
The creditors' second strategy is-as noted at the outset of this
Part52--to make clear to the directors that the creditors are the ones
who will be holding the company's stock after the reorganization, and
that they intend to dump any recalcitrant directors once they take
rather distant if the reover. This threat is more direct, but it is 5also
4
organization process is going to be lengthy.
50 For a similar point, see Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 17, at 784 ("Most large

firms that enter Chapter 11 lack enough free cash flow to operate without [DIP] financing."). As noted earlier, some lenders insist on direct board representation. See,
e.g., Maynard, supra note 16, at C2 (reporting that US Airways' chief lender will receive
increased board representation once the company emerges from Chapter 11).
51 11 U.S.C. § 1104
(2000).
52 See Sandberg & Lublin, supra note 18 and accompanying
text.
53 Shareholders sometimes receive a limited equity interest in the reorganized
company, but most of the equity goes to the company's creditors. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, BargainingOver Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 143 (1990) (discussing
data on dividing a reorganizing enterprise's value among various claims and interests).
54 Creditors could also object to proposed compensation
for disfavored directors
or refuse to vote for confirmation of a reorganization plan that does not bring in new
management. But there are obvious limitations to each of these strategies. Their
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In the absence of a direct way for creditors to take control of the
board, directorial norms play a crucial role in Chapter 11 governance.
To the extent creditors now have implicit veto power over directorial
changes, this influence suggests that directorial norms have shifted as
creditors have made increasing use of DIP financing agreements and
tailored compensation arrangements.
One interesting and important effect of Enron, WorldCom, and
the other recent headline cases is that they could powerfully reinforce
the norm of directorial responsiveness to creditors, and particularly to
creditors' calls for them to step down. Recall my prior statement that
courts are reluctant to appoint a trustee in the absence of fraud or
gross misconduct. Although the mega-bankruptcies of the 1980s and
early 1990s usually did not involve obvious, pervasive fraud, the most
spectacular recent cases are quite different. Just tick down a list of the
cases-Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, Adelphia-to see that each
is saturated in fraud. As a result, the creditors' threat to call for a trustee is far more potent than in previous years, and it seems quite likely
that these cases will color the thinking of courts and directors for
years to come. If courts are more willing to appoint a trustee (or if
the parties think the court would be more sympathetic to such a request), we can expect directors to listen even more closely to creditors' demands, even in cases that do not look remotely like Enron or
Global Crossing.
There is an obvious analogy between directors' heightened
responsiveness to creditors in Chapter 11 and the recent debate in
corporate law about staggered boards57-that is, boards that are divided into three or more classes of directors, only one of which comes

objections may be rejected and confirmation threats amount to another game of
chicken; creditors will be hurt if the case drags on. See Lopucki & Whitford, supra note
49, at 693-94 (describing the disadvantages to creditors brought on by a directorial delay of reorganization).
55 For a discussion of the shift in norms for directorial
performance outside of
bankruptcy over the past several decades, which emphasizes the new expectation that
directors engage in meaningful oversight, see Melvin A. Eisenberg, CorporateLaw and
Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1253, 1265 (1999).
56 Enron is perhaps the best illustration. Enron's board and its
bankruptcy lawyers
were rumored to have agreed to give the creditors' committee veto power over all major decisions, due in large part to the parties' assumption that the court would quickly
appoint a trustee if asked. See, e.g., Rebecca Smith & Mitchell Pacelle, Enron Plans to
Return to Its Roots: Draft Proposalto CreditorsEnvisions a Smaller Firm Focused on Hard Assets, WALL ST. J., May 2, 2002, at Al, A6 (referring to the enormous influence of Enron's creditors over the bankruptcy reorganization).
57 Thanks to Jesse Fried for encouraging me
to pursue this analogy.
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up for reelection in any given year. If a company has an effective
staggered board, an outside bidder cannot take control even if she
wins a proxy fight at the next annual meeting.8 Since only one-third
of board seats are in play each year, it takes two elections to acquire
control. In the past, the remaining directors generally stepped down
after the bidder took one-third of the seats; they assumed that there
was no point in sticking around, since the outside bidder would be in
charge after the next election. For the past decade, however, firms
have been able to combine their staggered board with a poison pill.
The poison pill prevents the bidder from acquiring a majority of the
firm's stock and thus makes it hard for the bidder to demonstrate control after it wins the initial proxy contest.59 In these cases, a different
directorial norm may be taking hold; the existing directors often seem
inclined to stick it out, rather than resigning to let the bidder take
60
over.
Given the vast number of consensual takeovers in the late 1990s,
we shouldn't draw sweeping conclusions about the extent to which
staggered boards interfere with takeovers. But the effect of staggered
boards on directorial acquiescence to bidders outside of bankruptcy
underscores-by way of contrast-just how much bankruptcy governance has changed in recent years. A decade ago, I and other commentators analogized Chapter 11 to an antitakeover device-a
mechanism that helped managers to entrench themselves, at least for
a while. 6' The new norm in bankruptcy, by contrast, is for directors to
accede to a change in control, rather than to resist.

For a discussion and a thorough analysis, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C.
Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards:
Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REv. 887, 902-24 (2002). "[S]taggered boards
are in fact extremely potent as an antitakeover device." Id.
59 Id. at 905 ("[T]he pill provides an impenetrable barrier to control
acquisitions.").
60 The most prominent counterexample seems to be that of Weyerhauser
Co.'s
hostile bid for Willamette Industries, Inc., where the Williamette board stepped down
after Weyerhauser won the initial proxy contest. Id. at 928 & n.127 (quoting Willamette
Industries Inc.: Weyerhaeuser Slate Gains Seats on Company's Board, WALL ST. J., July 17,
2001, at C13; Jim Carlton & Robin Sidel, Willamette Agrees to be Bought by Weyerhaeuser,
WALL ST.J.,Jan. 22, 2002, at A3.
61 See, e.g., David A. Skeel,Jr., Rethinking the Line Between CorporateLaw and Corporate
Bankruptcy, 72 TEX. L. REv. 471, 535 (1994) ("Like an antitakeover device, bankruptcy
can impair the market's ability to discipline managers because it may substitute reorganization procedures for market mechanisms that would otherwise lead to the ouster
of managers outside of bankruptcy." (footnote omitted)).
58
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THE VIRTUES OF THE "NEW" NEW BANKRUPTCY GOVERNANCE

Having described the effects of creditors' new governance levers,
let me begin the normative phase of my analysis with a few words of
praise. I will devote much more of my attention to possible problems
with the recent changes, but it is worth emphasizing that their overall
effect is both encouraging and exciting. The developments we have
witnessed in the past decade should be seen as a step in the right direction.
We need only recall the concerns of the 1980s and early 1990s to
appreciate the systemwide benefits of creditors' increased influence
over bankruptcy governance. No longer do we hear complaints about
endless extensions of the debtor's exclusivity period and cases that go
on forever. Nor do debtors' managers cling to highly unrealistic
hopes of reorganizing the firm in essentially its existing form: the
terms of the debtor's post-petition financing force it to sell assets that
are worth more in a buyer's hands, and performance-based executive
compensation arrangements encourage managers to move more
briskly through the Chapter 11 process. Now, it is in the managers'notjust creditors'-interests to reorganize as promptly as possible.
To this point, I have focused almost entirely on the ex post effects
of the creditors' new governance levers, their effect once the company
has encountered financial distress. But these levers have attractive
ex ante effects as well. An important benefit of the deviations from
absolute priority made possible by Chapter 11 is that they encourage
managers of a troubled firm to file for bankruptcy, rather than delaying as long as possible and destroying value as they fend off the inevitable."' But the prospect that shareholders will receive something,
even if the firm fails, gives managers and shareholders an incentive to
take excessive risks while the company is healthy. 63
If used effectively, the creditors' new governance levers can preserve the ex ante benefit of deviations from absolute priority while
reducing their downside. Overall, they diminish the likelihood of deviations from absolute priority by reining in the debtor's managers. At
See Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy:
An Essay
on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors'Bargain,75 VA. L. REv. 155, 169-74 (1989) (discussing eve-of-bankruptcy conflicts of interest that were present before the recent
changes in Chapter 11 governance).
See Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 439, 473
(1992) (asserting that during periods of debtor solvency, "bankruptcy allocation
increases management's incentives to take undue risks with the debtor's assets on equity's behalf").
62
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the same time, managers know they will be paid well in Chapter 11 if
creditors view them as part of the solution to the company's woes,
rather than as emblematic of its problems. The knowledge that they
will be reassessed at the outset of the bankruptcy case may make
managers less anxious to take value-destroying risks while the company is still solvent. To be sure, there is a risk that managers will respond by pursuing projects for which they are indispensable. But the
existing evidence suggests that there may be limits to managers'
abilities (and perhaps even their inclination) to entrench themselves
in this fashion.6
At its best, then, the "new" new bankruptcy governance offers a
simple and dramatically effective market-based response to the problems that plagued large-scale corporate reorganization a decade ago.
III. ToP HEAVY: THE DOWNSIDES OF THE DIP FINANCING

LEVER

Chapter l's generous treatment of DIP financing raises closely
related concerns, which stem from the priority status of this interim
financing. The first and most obvious concern-the one prior commentators have tended to emphasize-is the possibility that DIP financing will promote overinvestment.65 The risk of overinvestment is
the dark side of DIP financing's principal benefit that super-priority
can counteract creditors' unwillingness to fund even desirable projects if the borrower is insolvent. Although DIP financing makes it
possible to fund positive present value projects, thus solving a debtor's
underinvestment problems, it can also be used to fund negative present value projects, since the lender is protected by its priority status in
both contexts.
The question raised by the overinvestment concern is whether
courts or other decision makers can distinguish between good DIP
,financing arrangements (the underinvestment context) and bad ones
(the overinvestment context), and thus maximize the benefits of DIP

For a fascinating study that finds evidence to suggest the existence of limits
on
managers' abilities to entrench themselves within Sweden's automatic auction bankruptcy regime, see B. Espen Eckbo & Karin S. Thorburn, Control Benefits and CEO Discipline in Automatic Bankruptcy Auctions, 69J. FIN. ECON. 227, 244 (2003).
65 The best analysis of this issue, and still the leading article
on DIP financing, is
George G. Triantis, A Theory of the Regulation of Debtor-in-PossessionFinancing,46 VAND.
L. REV. 901 (1993) (suggesting that bankruptcy courts can counteract underinvestment problems, while minimizing the risk of overinvestment, through their decisions
to allow or disallow proposed DIP financing arrangements).
64
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financing and control its costs. 66 The principal focus here is on
screening-the initial decision whether, and on what terms, to authorize the DIP financing. But the growing use of DIP financing as a governance lever has underscored the fact that the DIP lender is not simply a passive supplier of capital . Its heightened prominence in major
cases raises a second issue: to the extent they are calling the shots, or
helping to call the shots, do DIP financiers have appropriate decision
making incentives during the Chapter 11 case? I will start with this
question and then return to consider some of the problematic terms
that are currently being included in DIP financing agreements.
To assess DIP lenders' role in Chapter 11 governance, it is useful
to begin by contrasting today's lenders to the investment banks that
played a similarly central role in the old equity receivership era. In
the early twentieth century, J.P. Morgan and Kuhn, Loeb & Co. represented shareholders and bondholders and often emerged from the
restructuring holding a chunk of the debtor's debt and stock. As a
6 Although many commentators have argued that DIP financing
leads to inefficient continuation of economically distressed companies and, thus, that overinvestment is a serious problem, the empirical evidence is more encouraging. Recent studies suggest that cases with DIP financing are more likely to lead to reorganization and
are resolved more quickly than cases without DIP financing.
See, e.g., MARIA
CARAPETO, DOES DEBTOR-IN-POSSESSION FINANCING ADD VALUE? (LBS Inst. of Fin. &
Acct., Working Paper No. 294-1999, forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 35, Oct. 6,
2003) (studying publicly traded companies that filed for bankruptcy during 1986-97
and concluding that "post-petition loans are associated with a greater possibility of successful reorganization"), available at http://www.cass.city.ac.uk/faculty/mcarapeto/
index.html; Sandeep Dahiya et al., Debtor-in-Possession Financing and Bankruptcy
Resolution: EmpiricalEvidence, 69J. FIN. ECON. 259, 270-76 (2003) (finding that DIP financing increases a firm's chances of emerging successfully from Chapter 11 in a sample taken from all Chapter 11 cases filed from 1988-97); see also Chatterjee et al., supra
note 31, at 15-16 (finding that firms increase in stock and public debt value when DIP
financing is approved).
67 Commentators have long been aware that banks play an important
role in the
insolvency context. See, e.g., Stuart C. Gilson, Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks and Blockholders,
27J. FIN. ECON. 355, 356 (1990) (describing the influence of banks on composition of
board of directors and other internal structural issues). My point is simply that lenders
have ratcheted up their role in large Chapter 11 cases in the past few years. For a
somewhat similar perspective, see Chatterjee et al., supra note 31, at 3, which emphasizes the monitoring role played by DIP lenders, in addition to the "certification" they
provide of debtor quality.
68 Although the bank usually had a minority stake, it often controlled
the governance of the reorganized firm, at least initially, pursuant to a voting trust arrangement
set up as part of the reorganization plan. See, e.g., 5 ARTHUR STONE DEWING, THE
FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 168-69 (1920) (describing the frequency of
bankers' governance of a reorganized firm while giving stockholders a new contingent
charge security); see also Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Control Rights,
PriorityRights, and the Conceptual Foundations of CorporateReorganizations,87 VA. L. REV.
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result, J.P. Morgan acted more like a residual claimant of the firm's
assets than, say, Citigroup now does.9 It benefited directly if the
reorganized debtor succeeded, and suffered if the company did
poorly. Moreover, because Morgan wished to persuade investors to
buy the bonds it underwrote in the future, it also had a reputational
stake in the success of the company.
Things look rather different from the modern DIP financers' secure perch at the top of the priority ladder. Because they face" a
downside risk if the debtor's fortunes are volatile,'0 but their upside
potential is fixed, DIP financers have• an incentive
to minimize volatil71
ity and to compress the debtor's risk profile•. In Chapter 11, the simplest way to do this is to convert most or all of the debtor's assets to
cash through sales. It is important not to overstate the point. If the
debtor's business is truly viable, and the lender hopes to continue its
lending relationship with the firm, the desire for future business will
counteract the impulse toward liquidation. If the debtor is not viable,
on the other hand, liquidation may be just what the doctor ordered.
On the margin, however, there is a risk that DIP lenders will put pressure on the debtor to liquidate too many assets prematurely if they are
calling the shots.

921, 930-36 (2001) (outlining the role of investment bankers in the reorganization and
recovery process during the age of J.P. Morgan and the reliance on equity receivership).
69 J.P. Morgan may have had a greater commitment to the debtor's
bonds than to
its stock. See, e.g., Tufano, supra note 22, at 29 (noting that the voting trusts used byJ.P.
Morgan and other banks to maintain control after the reorganization "were formally
initiated by shareholders, [but] in practice they usually were more concerned with
protecting bondholder interests"). But it still had much less of a tendency toward risk
aversion than most contemporary DIP financiers. For evidence that DIP lenders often
are not residual owners, yet exercise control in current cases, see Lynn M. LoPucki,
The Myth of the Residual Owner: An Empirical Study 21 (Apr. 29, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
70 The most dramatic illustration of this downside
risk is Winstar, whose DIP
lender supplied $225 million in financing, but realized only $42.5 million when Winstar's principal assets were sold. Winstar's ensuing legal wrangling, and the efforts of
creditors to recover, are documented in United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839
(1996). Lenders often point to the Winstar debacle as a justification for the extra
protections (such as insulation from preference actions) they demand as part of the
DIP financing agreement. In most cases, however, DIP lenders are unlikely to face this
kind of risk. See, e.g., LoPucki, supra note 69, at 21 (arguing that "in the large majority
of the cases studied[,]" DIP lenders were "protected by substantial cushions of
equi7 ").
One partial exception to this statement is DIP lenders who use DIP financing to
take control of the debtor. For discussion of the concerns raised in this contest, see
infra note 74 and accompanying text.
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The debtor's managers might seem to have an incentive to minimize the risk of an overweening DIP lender when they agree to the
terms of the DIP financing before bankruptcy. But managers are
likely to focus more on giving themselves one last chance than on
obtaining the optimal financing terms.
To the extent DIP lenders become too quick to liquidate, this impulse could not only lead to inefficient liquidation; it could undermine a salutary effect of large scale Chapter 11 cases that I will refer to
as the "antitrust benefit." What I mean by "antitrust benefit" is simply
that the failure of a prominent company can roil the competitive
structure of an industry. If the industry is already relatively concentrated, the disappearance of a major company might leave a small
number of companies that have significant market share. In the airline industry, for instance, if United, US Airways, and perhaps one or
two of the other troubled airlines were liquidated or absorbed into
their healthier peers, the industry could become increasingly monopolistic. By providing a way for existing companies to reorganize in
stand-alone form, Chapter 11 supplies a benefit that has received sur72
prisingly little attention from bankruptcy commentators.
Further,
once we focus on the antitrust benefit of Chapter 11, it immediately
becomes apparent that recent complaints that WorldCom and other
firms have gotten an unfair competitive benefit from bankruptcy are
misguided. .
If Chapter 11 was replaced with, say, mandatory auctions, the antitrust benefit could disappear. In an auction, the most likely bidders

72

It is important to note that even if DIP lenders had an incentive to maximize

the value of the debtor, this would not give them an incentive to protect the antitrust
benefit. The antitrust benefit is a positive externality created by Chapter 11-a social
benefit rather than a benefit to the firm itself. In contrast to this positive externality,
bankruptcy also produces negative externalities in at least one critical area: the rules
for assumption and rejection of contracts give the debtor an incentive to reject contracts that are socially desirable. See Alon Chaver & Jesse M. Fried, Managers'Fiduciary
Duty Upon the Firm's Insolvency: Accounting for Performance Creditors, 55 VAND. L. REv.
1813, 1831-38 (2002) (discussing insolvent firms' tendency to underinvest in potentially lucrative contracts).
3 See, e.g., Simon London, Critics Are Hoping It Could be End of Stoy for Chapter
11,
FIN. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2001, at 22 (quoting Verizon CEO's complaint that WorldCom
and Global Crossing can "use Chapter 11 'to cleanse their sins, then drive prices
down"'). While WorldCom's competitors would prefer that WorldCom be dismembered, the loss of a major player would significantly increase industry concentration.
Another complaint is that companies that have been reorganized will have so
much less debt that they will have a competitive advantage over the other companies in
their industry. But if having less debt is attractive, the competitors can simply issue
more stock and use the proceeds to retire debt.
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are other companies in the same industry. This is not always the case,
of course, but in an auction regime, regulators would more frequently
be faced with the decision whether to exclude industry bidders (and
perhaps set the stage for piecemeal liquidation as a result) or to permit an industry bid that could ratchet up industry concentration.
To this point, I have lingered over the troublesome incentives of a
DIP lender who faces at least some downside risk. However, if the
lender is fully protected, there is a different concern: although a fully
protected lender is less likely to have a bias toward liquidation, it may,
in a sense, be indifferent to the fate of the firm. After all, the lender's
collateral assures that it will get paid even if Chapter 11 fails to produce a sensible allocation of the debtor's assets. Once again, I do
not want to overstate my point. In an increasingly competitive DIP
financing market, lenders would not want to earn a reputation for
regularly presiding over needlessly sinking ships. And a lender that
wishes to continue lending to the debtor after bankruptcy, as a significant number of DIP lenders do, will have at least some concern for
maximizing the value of the debtor's assets. But the lender's protected status puts it in a very different position than J.P. Morgan and
its peers in the old equity receivership days. A fully protected bank
has a much more attenuated stake in the effectiveness of the restructuring process.
A final issue is the use of DIP financing agreements to bring about
a takeover of a Chapter 11 firm. While these transactions are grounds
more for applause than for concern, there is a risk that a takeover
bidder that enters the picture as a source of DIP financing will use the
DIP financing agreement to effectively preclude other bidders. In
these cases, the DIP financing agreement may serve notjust to cause a
74
change in control, but also to dictate its terms.
So, just how serious are these concerns? Overall, the emergence
of DIP financing agreements as a central text of Chapter 11 is a welcome advance, for all of the reasons I briefly described in the last part.
But, in at least some cases, the fetters are too tight; the restrictions
enshrined in the DIP financing agreement will have perverse effects as
the case progresses.

74 The most prominent current example is US Airways.
As discussed earlier, see
supra note 33 and accompanying text, Retirement Systems of Alabama negotiated for
the right to appoint seven directors and for thirty-six percent of the stock of the reorganized airline. The agreement effectively dictated the shape of the US Airways reorganization.
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How might we address these downsides of the DIP financing
lever? Let me suggest and critique three possible responses, starting
with the most dramatic. The first option is to rethink the way corporate debtors finance their reorganization effort. As we have seen,
post-petition lenders (i.e., the holders of receivers' certificates) had
very little role in corporate governance during the equity receivership
era. One way to edge back in this direction and curb the influence of
DIP lenders would be to sharply restrict the scope of DIP lending and
force the debtor to fund the reorganization through new financing
(such as selling stock or debt) at the confirmation of the bankruptcy
case.
Although shifting the focus from commercial to investment banks
would be quite attractive in some contexts, it has serious shortcomings
as a general response to DIP lenders' suboptimal decision-making incentives in large Chapter 11 cases. The most important problem is
simply that it would be quite difficult to stuff the genie back in the
bottle. Investment bankers no longer play the active oversight role
they did in the J.P. Morgan era, and commercial banking has evolved
to fill that vacuum. An additional problem is that bank borrowing
often makes more sense than issuing public debt when a company
emerges from bankruptcy, given the likelihood that the ownership
structure of the reorganized firm will be concentrated .
The second strategy would be to subject the DIP lending to a vote
of the firm's general creditors, since the general creditors are likely to
be the party with the best decision-making incentives. One way to
structure the vote would be to permit the court to authorize the initial
DIP financing at the outset of the case, then require creditor approval
if the debtor wishes to increase the scope (either in amount or dura76
tion) of the financing arrangement.
Although creditor. voting is

If a company has concentrated equity, concentrated debt (such as a bank loan)
is generally a more cost-effective source of funds than diffuse debt (such as bonds),
due to agency cost problems created by the mismatch between concentrated equity
and diffuse debt. SeeJohn Armour et al., Corporate Ownership Structure and the Evolution
of Bankruptcy Law: Lessons from the United Kingdom, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1699, 1763-67
(2002) (discussing the benefit of matching concentrated equity and concentrated
debt).
76 The timing of the two-step sequence would
be somewhat similar to the approach many bankruptcy courts currently use. These courts give initial approval to
DIP financing almost immediately, and then hold a formal hearing thereafter. Creditors have the right to object to the DIP loan at the hearing, but they do not have
authority to approve or reject as they would under creditor voting.
The creditor-voting concept has received substantial attention in the sovereign
debt context. See, e.g., WILLIAM W. BRATITON & G. MITU GULATI, SOVEREIGN DEBT
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more realistic, it too has important downsides. Holding a vote during
the early stages of a Chapter 11 case would be quite cumbersome, for
instance. And if creditors could be expected to vote down (or force
renegotiation of) a nontrivial number of DIP lending proposals, DIP
lenders might be reluctant to commit to the financing ex ante.
The third, and most realistic, response is to continue to rely on
ex post oversight by the bankruptcy court. Many bankruptcy judges
already leave themselves leeway to change course on a DIP financing
agreement they previously approved . Under extraordinary circumstances, a court might refuse to enforce a DIP financing provision
according to its terms. 78 More importantly, a more fine-tuned inquiry
when the DIP financing is first proposed could eliminate some of the
most obvious current abuses. When the debtor turns to an existing
lender for DIP financing, for example, courts have sometimes
approved loan agreements that protect the lender against possible
preference actions. The shield against preference will often improve
the status of the lender's prepetition loan, converting it from potentially unsecured to fully secured, which raises serious overinvestment
concerns.7
The obvious solution to this problem is for courts
to refuse to permit these protections, as most courts now refuse to

RESTRUCTURING AND THE BEST INTEREST OF CREDITORS 3-6 (Geo. Wash. Univ. Law

Sch., Pub. Law Research Paper No. 59, Geo. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 387880,
2003) (on file with author) (proposing creditor vote as a means of facilitating interim
financing). For a variation, see Patrick Bolton & David A. Skeel, Jr., Inside the Black
Box: How Should a Sovereign Bankruptcy Framework Be Structured? 47-50 (Apr. 2,
2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), which argues for court approval
of limited interim financing, with creditor vote required for larger loans.
77 See, e.g., Judge PeterJ. Walsh, Open Letter to the Delaware
Bankruptcy Bar re:
First Day DIP Financing Orders, 13 (April 2, 1998), in Marcus Cole, DelawareIs Not a
State: Are We WitnessingJurisdictionalCompetition in Bankruptcy , 55 VAND. L. REv. 1845,
1914 app. A (2002) ("The period of time during which the creditors' committee
should have the right to challenge the lenders' prepetition position should generally
be at least sixty days from the appointment of the committee.").
78 If the agreement requires that a key division be sold unless it is
cash flow positive within ninety days, for instance, a court might hold the DIP lender at bay if, after
ninety days, the sale seemed likely to undermine the restructuring effort. But it should
be noted that there is a strong presumption against undoing the terms of a DIP financing agreement. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 364(e) (2000) ("The reversal or modification on
appeal of an authorization under this section to obtain credit or incur debt.., does
not affect the validity of any debt so incurred .... ").
79 The concern is that the added protection will facilitate borrowing to
finance
value-decreasing projects, such as the continuation of a business that should be liquidated. For an extensive discussion examining the effect that giving preferences to certain creditors in bankruptcy has on dynamic asset pools, see Barry E. Adler, A
Re-Examination of NearBankruptcyInvestment Incentives, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 575 (1995).
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s
permit so-called cross collateralization provisions.8
Similarly, courts
should refuse to authorize roll-up transactions that protect a DIP financier's pre-petition lending unless it is clear that the pre-petition
loan is fully secured."'
Notice that the approach I have just outlined is a bit of a doubleedged sword. Limiting the scope of the DIP lending agreement may
increase the risk that the DIP lender later will become undersecured,
and thus exacerbate the lender's incentive to push for liquidation.
Lenders are likely to adjust to this risk, however, by limiting their

lending ex ante. It is the benefits of these ex ante adjustments that
justify closer scrutiny of the provisions DIP lenders are currently trying
to sneak into their lending agreements.
Provisions that bring about a change of control by promising the
lender a specified equity interest in the reorganized debtor are a trickier issue. One attraction of this arrangement is that it gives the lender
a direct stake in the outcome of the reorganization, thus addressing
the problem of DIP lenders' priority status. But the equity guarantee
is quite similar to a stock lockup of the sort that would be unenforceable outside of bankruptcy. 2 For similar reasons, the promise of a
voting stake should be prohibited in bankruptcy.
In short, courts should be especially wary when the debtor obtains
DIP financing from an existing lender and should invalidate provi-

sions that enhance the status of a prepetition loan. Provisions that
lock in a change of control and stiff arm alternative bidders are also
suspect. In each case, judicial discretion is likely to be the simplest
and most realistic device for responding to the concerns posed by existing DIP financing agreements.

so Cross collateralization provisions secure not only the lender's post-petition
loans, but also unsecured (or undersecured) advances the lender made prior to bankruptcy. The leading case on these provisions is Shapiro v. Saybrook ManufacturingCo. (In
re Saybrook Mfg. Co.), 963 F.2d 1490, 1495 (11th Cir. 1992), which concludes that crosscollateralization is not authorized by the Bankruptcy Code.
81 In a roll-up, the DIP lender's pre-petition loan is incorporated into
the new DIP
financing. The effect is to assure administrative expense priority for any payments
due.
82 See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network
Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 51
(Del. 1994) (invalidating a stock purchase guarantee in the hostile tender offer context). For an extensive analysis of the appropriate treatment of lockups, both in and
out of bankruptcy, see David A. Skeel, Jr., Lockups and Delaware Venue in Corporate Law
and Bankruptcy, 68 U. CIN. L. REv. 1243 (2000).
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IV. FINE-TUNING THE SECOND GOVERNANCE LEVER: EXECUTIVE PAY

Of the two new governance levers, the second, performance-based
executive pay packages, has provoked most of the sound and fury.
When Polaroid proposed a retention bonus package for forty-five
executives after it filed for bankruptcy, the proposal drew such a hostile response that the debtor was forced to shelve it.ss This outrage,
which also has surfaced in recent cases, says more about perceptions
than economic incentives. Indeed, in terms of incentives alone, retention bonuses are less troubling than the leverage wielded by postpetition financers, but the perception issue matters and we will need
to account for it.
To make sense of the executive pay issues, we also need to consider the cash flowing into executive coffers before the case is actually
filed. Companies that are in financial distress often pay retention bonuses before they ever file for bankruptcy. The justification for the
bonuses is quite similar to that of performance-based, post-petition
compensation, and so too is the outrage stemming from it. In recent
cases, courts have been asked to set aside these bonuses on fraudulent
conveyance grounds.
I soon will take up each of the issues-pre-bankruptcy bonuses
and performance-based bankruptcy pay-in turn. But first, let me say
a bit more about the fault-line running through these managerial pay
questions-the tension between incentives and perceived fairness.
The case for bonuses and performance-based pay is quite simple. In
order to restructure a troubled company, the company must persuade
its good managers to stay and give them performance-based incentives
to achieve a prompt, efficient reorganization. These, after all, are the
executives who know the business best. The case against these bonuses begins with the question of why we should be paying lucrative
bonuses to the very executives who managed to steer the company
into bankruptcy. In part, this reflects the longstanding debate as to
See Polaroid Withdraws $5 Million Bonus Plan to Retain Executives, WALL ST. J., Jan.
14, 2002, at B5 ("[T]he plan infuriated employees and retirees... the other bonusesincluding the remainder of the $5 million-would now be shelved while the company
tries to come up with another arrangement."). Nor is the sound and fury limited to
executives who were running the company when it filed for bankruptcy. WorldCom's
proposed pay package for Michael Capellas, whom it brought over from Hewlett Packard to take the reins in the middle of the Chapter 11 case, drew sharp criticism from a
district court judge who is involved in the case. See Rebecca Blumenstein & Lingling
Wei, WorldCom CEO's Pay is Criticized, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2002, at B5 (indicating that
Judge Jed S. Rakoff expressed serious concerns about WorldCom management's
commitment to needed reforms).
83
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whether it is better to keep the existing managers in place because
they know the business best or to kick the bums out because they ran
the company into bankruptcy. s4 But there is a more visceral fairness
concern as well. Watching executives take their lucrative bankruptcy
bonuses is deeply disturbing to many-especially other employees,
many of whom have lost their jobs, pensions, or both. "It is hard
to imagine," a WorldCom employee wrote in opposition to WorldCom's bonus plan, "that... the efforts of [329 key employees] are
1600 times more valuable than all other personnel at the
Company." s5 While the plan might "maintain [the] morale" of the favored employees, it "will in no way send a positive message to anyone"
else.8 6 "Many employees are necessary to implement the reorganiza8' 7
tion plan," she reminded the court, "not just the key employees. "
Finally, it is not always obvious that retention bonuses are truly necessary to persuade managers, many of whom may not have other job
prospects, to stick around.
Let us start by taking a closer look at the use of retention bonuses
on the eve of bankruptcy.1s
Kmart is perhaps the best recent

In most other countries, managers are blamed for and immediately
displaced
when a company files or ends up in bankruptcy or insolvency cases. See, e.g., Armour et
al., supra note 75, at 1729, 1745 (describing manager displacement in Germany, Japan
and England).
85 Letter from Julie A. Harazduk, WorldCom, Inc. employee,
to ArthurJ. Gonzalez,
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge 1 (Oct. 24, 2002) (on file with author) (objecting to the Debtors' Motion to establish a key employee retention plan in In re WorldCom, Inc., 296
B.R. 115 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003)).
84

86
87

Id.
Id.

A somewhat related compensation issue is the sale of stock by executives shortly
before bankruptcy. In the simplest case, the executive sells stock that she previously
purchased (generally by exercising stock options) or was given by the company. Gary
Winnick, the former CEO of Global Crossing, sold a whopping $500 million worth
of stock in the two years before the company filed for bankruptcy. See Andrew Hill,
Barons of Bankruptcy Part III: Let the Good Pay Roll-for Good Performance, FIN. TIMES,
Aug. 2, 2002, at 10 (showing how executives, such as Winnick, cushioned themselves
against their companies' collapse but angered investors in the process). For Enron's
Ken Lay, the harvest was roughly $220 million. See CorporateAmerica's Woes, Continued,
ECONOMIST, Nov. 30, 2002, at 60 (explaining how such rewards produced a backlash
among the public that led to reforms).
Pre-bankruptcy stock sales are much harder to defend in incentive terms than the
other forms of compensation we will consider. It is not obvious that these sales are
essential to retaining top managers and encouraging them to maximize shareholder
value. But see Henry G. Manne, Options? Nah. Try Insider Trading,WALL ST. J., Aug. 2,
2002, at A8 (defending insider trading generally on compensation grounds and as a
mechanism for providing valuable information to the market). Executive stock sales
look suspiciously like preferential transfers-that is, transfers that favor one claimant
88
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illustration. Less than a month before bankruptcy, Kmart doled out
$30 million in "retention loans" to its then-CEO, Charles Conaway,
and several other top executives. Retention bonuses can be justified
as the only, or at least, a necessary, way to persuade key managers
to stay.90 However, this doesn't mean that retention bonuses simply
should be permitted with no second thoughts. Pre-bankruptcy retention bonuses raise both efficiency and fairness concerns. Whether
one emphasizes efficiency or fairness, the chief concern is the agency
cost of managers focusing on their own interests rather than what is
best for the company. The company's directors are in effect paying
their own kind when they pay retention bonuses to top managers, and
over others when there are not enough assets to go around, and which have long been
prohibited under American bankruptcy law. See 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2000) (authorizing
trustee to retrieve transfers by the debtor within ninety days of bankruptcy, with a one
year reachback if the transferee is an insider). To be sure, there are as many differences as similarities. Stock sales, for instance, don't deplete the company's assets to
the same extent as preferential transfers. But stock sales leave the executives better off
than ordinary creditors and employees, as would a true preference.
Existing bankruptcy law does little to address the problem of pre-bankruptcy stock
sales. Stock sales cannot be reversed as preferences because they do not involve
a payment by the company on a preexisting debt, and the sales do not qualify as
fraudulent conveyances if the executive is selling stock (or converting options) she
already owns. Under Rule l0b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (2003), an executive could be forced to disgorge her profits on insider
trading grounds if she had "material" nonpublic information when she sold, but this
standard is quite difficult to prove unless there is an obvious information event, such as
a forthcoming quarterly statement that the executive knows will have surprising new
negative information.
The obvious solution is to simply amend the Bankruptcy Code to apply the same
rules to stock sales that are applied to preferences. Executives should be forced to
disgorge the proceeds of any stock sales they make within eighteen months of bankruptcy. For a similar conclusion and proposals for corporate governance reforms to
address Enron and subsequent scandals, see Henry M. Paulson, Chairman and CEO
The Goldman Sachs Group, Restoring Investor Confidence: An Agenda for Change,
Speech to National Press Club, Washington, D.C. Uune 5, 2002) available at http://
www.cglv.hbs.edu/pdf/ViewpointsPaulsonRestoring.pdf. Some might worry that the
disgorgement rule would give executives an incentive to postpone filing for bankruptcy
in order to protect their stock sales. But it seems unlikely that the executives could
postpone the inevitable long enough for this to be an effective strategy. Overall, then,
disgorgement would provide obvious fairness benefits without seriously interfering
with efficiency.
89 Amy Merrick, Kmart Officers Cot Big Loans Before it Filedfor Chapter
1, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 17, 2002, at B1. In theory, the executives were required to repay the loans, but, to
the extent there was no expectation of repayment or the terms were more lenient than
a market loan, they functioned like bonuses.
9o Observers noted, for instance, that "[flor years, Kmart had trouble making
its
merchandising systems work well and desperately needed to keep senior executives
who oversaw those systems." Id. According to one expert, a "wholesale exodus would
have meant 'they'd never get any merchandise out of the stores."' ld.
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one can't help suspecting that some will use retention bonuses as one
last opportunity to ensure themselves a big payday."'
As it turns out, existing law already provides a mechanism for challenging pre-bankruptcy pay packages that look more like handouts
than efforts to retain key executives. Fraudulent conveyance law
authorizes the bankruptcy court to reverse a transfer made by an insolvent debtor if the debtor did not receive "reasonably equivalent"
value in exchange.92 If I sell my house to my sister for $1 before filing
for bankruptcy, the transaction will be voided as a fraudulent conveyance. Although the facts are more subtle, one can make the same
kind of argument about excessively generous pre-bankruptcy retention bonuses. Fraudulent conveyance scrutiny has an unavoidably
impressionistic quality. Given the benefits of a well-designed retention bonus plan, this ad hoc approach is preferable to per se prohibition, but it also forces us to consider how a judge can determine
whether she is looking at a well-structured plan or a disguised handout. One factor that courts should consider is whether the plan gives
the executive a direct incentive to stay. A plan that conditions some
or all of its benefits on the executive continuing in her post is more
defensible than an immediate cash payment, as is a plan that includes
The court should also consider
performance-based incentives. 3
to previous bonuses and
comparison
the magnitude of the bonus in
the executive's overall pay, as well as compensation levels in other,
comparable companies.
91 For an argument that executive compensation arrangements outside of
bankruptcy are more likely to reflect managerial power than optimal contracting, see
Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., ManagerialPower and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive
Compensation,69 U. CHI. L. REv. 751 (2002).
92 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1) (B) -(2000). The bankruptcy trustee can
also use state

fraudulent conveyance provisions such as those based on the Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act ("UFTA"). UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER Acr §§ 4-5, 7A U.L.A. 266,
301 (1999) The trustee's power to do this comes from 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (2000),
which authorizes the trustee to invoke any non-bankruptcy law that one of the debtor's
unsecured creditors could have invoked outside of bankruptcy. There is relatively
The principal
little substantive difference between § 548 and the UFIA.
distinction is that the UFITA provides a longer statute of limitations.
93 Kmart's "retention loans" introduce another twist on this theme. See Merrick,
supra note 89, at BI (discussing the loans top executives received just before Kmart
filed for bankruptcy). Both the loan itself (if it appears that Kmart had no intention of
requiring repayment) and the company's subsequent decision to forgive the loan can
be challenged on fraudulent conveyance grounds. The case for disgorgement is
strongest if, as with some of the Kmart loans, the loan is forgiven without any obligation for the employee to remain at the company.
94 Outside of bankruptcy, compensation arrangements can
also be challenged
on fiduciary duty grounds. Delaware courts have traditionally shown a great deal of

2003]

CREDITORS' BALL

Turn now to retention bonuses that are put in place after the
company files for bankruptcy. Post-petition pay packages raise the
same kinds of concerns as pre-bankruptcy bonuses, but with some very
important differences. The key distinction is that the directors cannot
unilaterally implement a bonus program once the company has filed
for bankruptcy; the program must be presented to the bankruptcy
court for approval. This means that creditors have the right to file
formal objections; and, in practice, creditors weigh in long before the
formal hearing. As a result, with post-petition pay packages, there is
much less reason to worry that managers are helping themselves at the
expense of the business than there is with pre-bankruptcy compensation plans.'
The one concern that does loom large in the bankruptcy context
is the perception of fairness. Particularly troubling to many is the
possibility that managers could make even more money in bankruptcy
than they did while the company was healthy. One prominent bankruptcy lawyer put it this way: "'In an enterprise [PSINet, a networking
company] where catastrophic amounts of money were lost, the notion
that people should have to be compensated over and above what they
were already getting is offensive." 9 6
What does this mean for judicial oversight of bankruptcy bonus
plans? The short answer is that courts should not simply rubber stamp
any proposed plan, but should exercise a stronger presumption of
approval than they do with pre-bankruptcy bonus packages. The presumption should be especially strong if most or all of the company's
creditors support the plan. Of course this does not mean that the
current post-petition pay arrangements are optimal; rather, they are
likely to be superior to straight cash compensation.

deference to compensation arrangements that are approved by a disinterested committee of directors. See, e.g., Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327 (Del. Ch. 1997) (quoting Beard v. Elster, 160 A.2d 731, 738 (Del. 1960), for the proposition that decisions
reached by a disinterested board of directors should be given the utmost deference by
the courts). But Delaware's judges have hinted that they plan to scrutinize these
arrangements more closely in the future, and recent cases are consistent with this

warning. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003).
This suggests that fiduciary duty is an alternative line of attack that could be invoked in

bankruptcy.

95 Stated differently, the creditors (who are the company's residual owners
once it
files for bankruptcy) exercise much more oversight once the company files than
shareholders (or creditors) do with pre-bankruptcy bonus plans.
96 Davis, supra note 31, at C2 (quoting Chaim Fortgang, a New York
attorney then
with Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen, & Katz, who represents creditors exclusively).
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Let me conclude by taking a closer look at the existing arrangements and possible alternatives to them. The first generation of payfor-performance contracts-the contracts we are seeing now-have
tended to tie managers' performance bonuses to the speed of the
case. Although speed is likely to correlate fairly closely with the goal
of maximizing the value of the debtor's assets, one certainly can imagine other approaches. Is there a different measure that would more
closely link managers' effectiveness to their bankruptcy pay? Two possible alternatives come to mind. The first, and most precise, measure
would be to base the managers' pay on the overall value of the
debtor's assets at the conclusion of the Chapter 11 case. Tying the
managers' pay to the debtor's value would give them a strong
incentive to take whatever steps were necessary to maximize value,
whether this meant a quick reorganization case or a longer, more
thorough process. This strategy works nicely if the company is being
liquidated. In reorganization, by contrast, assessing the overall value
of the debtor's assets is more difficult, but in at least some cases it is a
plausible compensation strategy.97
The second alternative would be to promise managers a portion
of the stock of the reorganized entity. Outside of bankruptcy, stockbased measures have been criticized as poorly correlated with the executives' performance, given that stock price is affected by a variety of
factors over which the executives have no control. 9s External factors
(changes in interest rates or energy prices, for instance) also would
influence the value of a reorganized company's stock. But lest we give
up on this approach too quickly, I should hasten to add that the managers' efforts have a surprisingly direct effect on the value of the company's stock when it emerges from bankruptcy. The value of the
company's post-bankruptcy stock will depend not only on the value of
its assets, but also on how much debt the company is able to shed in
bankruptcy. Managers play a direct role in both of these areas,
and both are important bankruptcy objectives. This suggests that
stock-based compensation may be a promising alternative to bonuses
based on speed.

For a recent illustration describing the asset value-based pay in the Adelphia
case, see Gretchen Morgenson, Bankruptcy: A New Route to Riches, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8,
2003, at Cl.
98 See, e.g., Bebchuk et al., supra note 91,
at 796-802 (explaining that commonly
used stock-based option plans rarely attempt to screen out price changes that have no
connection to the executives' performance).
97
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So why haven't managers been offered post-reorganization stock
more frequently? There may be some question as to whether the
court can set aside "when-issued" stock, " ) but this doesn't explain why
stock-based pay packages are rarely proposed. The possibility that the
company may be liquidated rather than reorganized is similarly
incomplete. A substantial majority of the largest corporate debtors do
in fact reorganize, and the compensation plan could be adjusted to
provide for cash compensation in the event of liquidation. The most
likely reasons that stock-based compensation is seldom used are that
managers like the greater certainty of cash-based performance pay,
creditors much prefer that executive pay be linked to speed, and both
would, therefore, resist a stock-based approach. The best normative
defense of this aversion to stock-based pay is that it could have a troubling effect on managers' incentives in at least a few cases. Managers
might threaten to destroy value, or actually destroy value, in order to
coerce creditors to accept a draconian "haircut," for instance.100 However, there is also a less benign explanation as to why creditors haven't
clamored for stock-based pay: creditors would much rather have managers focus on speed, since this diminishes the managers' incentives
to play hardball with respect to the haircut creditors are expected to
take.
The upshot is that the emergence of performance-based pay in
bankruptcy should be seen as a welcome development, and courts
should continue to approve compensation packages that have substantial creditor support. But there is room for continued experimentation. The most intriguing possibility is the one we have just discussed; that is, promising to give a debtor's managers a slice of the
reorganized company's stock.
V. CONCLUSION: CONTRACTING AFTER THE FALL

Bankruptcy isn't exactly a place one expects to see the Coase
theorem in action. Bankruptcy is full of intricate regulation and judiYet, to a remarkable extent, creditors have
cial intervention.

Nothing in the Bankruptcy Code explicitly prohibits the use of when-issued
stock as compensation, but some bankruptcy lawyers worry that this strategy would interfere with the reorganization process and might therefore be struck down as a "sub
rosa" reorganization plan. Interview with Bill Schorling, supra note 47.
100The notion here is that managers can enhance the value of their when-issued
stock by increasing the value of the firm, sharply reducing its debt, or both. The concern is that managers could credibly threaten to destroy value if this loss in value were
more than offset by a dramatic scaling down of creditors' claims.
99
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responded to the complaints of the past two decades in precisely the
way Coase might predict. Stung in the 1980s by managers' tendency
to drag out Chapter 11 cases, creditors have used post-petition lending agreements and managerial compensation contracts to reshape
corporate governance in Chapter 11. Cases now move faster, and
managers spend much more time overseeing merger and acquisition
activity than caballing in smoky backrooms.'O°
Corrections, of course, never lead us back to a mythological
Archimedean point. Adjustments bring their own problems and their
own characteristic flaws. Much of our discussion has focused on the
dangers of the two new governance levers. With DIP financing
agreements, we saw that DIP financers may use the interim financing
agreement to improve the status of their pre-bankruptcy loans, and
the lenders' priority could give them too great a bias toward liquidation on the margin. Rather than making structural changes to counteract this bias, the best solution is simply for courts to restrict the
provisions that they will permit in a DIP financing agreement, particularly when the debtor obtains DIP financing from an existing lender.
With managerial compensation, courts should sharply distinguish
compensation agreements that came before bankruptcy from those
that are proposed during the bankruptcy case. Pre-bankruptcy bonuses are far more likely to reflect managerial self-dealing and should
be scrutinized on fraudulent conveyance grounds. Post-petition compensation, on the other hand, is subject to significant creditor oversight. Creditor support is a good indicator that the program will have
a beneficial effect on Chapter 11 governance and should be approved.
Ex post contracts are a second-best solution to the risk that managers will destroy value in Chapter 11 by pursuing their own private
interests, rather than maximizing overall firm or social value. A bankruptcy contract that addressed these issues in advance-for instance,
by giving managers an incentive to pursue liquidation rather than
0 2
reorganization if this were efficient-might be preferable in theory.1

101

Creditors' responses to concerns about Chapter 11 parallels, in intriguing

respects, the increased use of incentive-based compensation outside of bankruptcy
after Delaware upheld the use of poison pills. Incentive-based compensation seems to
have diminished managers' hostility to takeover bids. See Marcel Kahan & Edward B.
Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law,
69 U. CHi. L. REv. 871, 897 (2002) ("There is substantial evidence that [incentivebased compensation packages] have neutralized to a substantial extent managerial opposition to unsolicited bids.").
102 See Barry E. Adler, A Theory of Bankruptcy Insolvency, 72 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 343, 36775 (1997) (suggesting that, if given the opportunity, firms might design their capital
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And I wholeheartedly agree with the commentators who have suggested that corporate debtors should be permitted to devise their own
bankruptcy rules and to opt out of bankruptcy, if they so choose. But
ex ante contracting has its own downsides, 0 3 and the most important
comparison for present purposes is the comparison between current
bankruptcy practice and Chapter 11 in the Eastern Airlines era, circa
1990.
In the past decade, many commentators have dismissed Chapter
11 as hopelessly flawed, and others have suggested that the world has
passed it by. The new bankruptcy governance shows that the bankruptcy framework has more life than anyone would have predicted.
Companies look different than they did in the old railroad receivership days, but the parties have continued to adapt the same general
framework that was first developed well over a century ago. The two
new governance levers are the latest chapter in this story, and they are
transforming Chapter 11 from a takeover defense to what, at the moment, is our most vibrant market for corporate control.

structure so that liquidation would always be the appropriate resolution in the event of
default); Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE L.J.
1807, 1839 (1998) ("[W]hile a bankruptcy system is needed, the question of which
system parties should use in particular cases should be for the parties to decide." (emphasis added)).
103 The most obvious difficulties with tailored, ex ante bankruptcy contracts
are
issues of implementation, such as the question of how to effectively alter the contract
when the company's fortunes or economic conditions change.
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